We examine the impact of productivity increases in a simple model of the entrepreneurial sector. Not surprisingly, many productivity increases generate gains for entrepreneurs and/or venture capitalists. However, some productivity increases generate Pareto losses. Furthermore, less capable entrepreneurs may bene…t more from policies that increase the productivity of more capable entrepreneurs than from policies that increase their own productivity. Therefore, the design of policy to enhance welfare in the entrepreneurial sector can entail important subtleties.
Introduction.
The entrepreneurial sector is a large and growing component of many economies.
1 Consequently, enhanced performance in the entrepreneurial sector can generate signi…cant gains in the economy as a whole. An important task, therefore, is to identify activities that enhance the performance of the entrepreneurial sector. This research undertakes one element of this task by examining how several types of productivity increases a¤ect performance in a simple, stylized model of the entrepreneurial sector.
The productivity increases that we analyze can arise from many di¤erent sources, including reduced input prices, more e¢ cient capital markets, and enhanced entrepreneurial skills generated by public or private training programs.
It would be natural to presume that any productivity increase in the entrepreneurial sector would increase the welfare of some or all sector participants. Indeed, governments often implement policies that are designed to improve the skills of entrepreneurs and salaried workers alike, and thereby increase welfare throughout the economy. 2 Thus, it is not surprising that productivity increases of all types generate Pareto gains in our model when all parties have symmetric information about the potential returns from each entrepreneur's project.
However, di¤erent conclusions can emerge when entrepreneurs are privately informed about the quality of their projects. In such settings, some productivity increases can even produce Pareto losses.
Some entrepreneurs in our model have access to high quality projects that are relatively likely to succeed. Other entrepreneurs only have access to low quality projects that are less likely to succeed. The di¤erence in project success probabilities may re ‡ect innate di¤erences in project characteristics and/or di¤erences in entrepreneurial skills. Entrepreneurs have no wealth, and so must borrow the funds required to implement their projects from a venture 1 More than six million new businesses were created in the United States in 2009. This entrepreneurial activity "represents the highest level over the past decade and a half" (Fairlie, 2010, p. 2) . 2 For descriptions and assessments of selected policies, see Heckman (1998) , Krueger and Rouse (1998) , Heckman et al. (1999) , Leuven and Oosterbeek (2004) , and Abramovsky et al. (2011) , for example. 1 capitalist ("the lender"). Although each entrepreneur knows the quality of his project, the lender only observes an imperfect signal about project quality. The lender funds projects that generate a favorable signal and declines to fund projects that generate an unfavorable signal.
This representation of the entrepreneurial sector admits a straightforward analysis of the e¤ects of di¤erent types of productivity increases. We consider increases in the revenue generated by successful projects, which might re ‡ect enhanced product quality or improved marketing channels, for example. We also analyze the e¤ects of reduced costs of funding and operating projects, which could stem from more e¢ cient capital markets or lower costs of raw materials. In addition, we consider increases in the success rates of entrepreneurial projects, which could re ‡ect the impact of training programs, for instance. In practice, some training programs are designed to improve basic skills, and so tend to be of primary bene…t to entrepreneurs with relatively limited skills. 3 Other training programs focus on developing more advanced capabilities and so tend to be of particular bene…t to more highly skilled entrepreneurs. 4 We …nd that di¤erent types of productivity increases can produce very di¤erent outcomes.
To illustrate this conclusion, consider …rst the e¤ect of an advanced training program that serves primarily to increase the probability that high quality projects succeed. This productivity increase induces the lender to increase the payment she promises to approved entrepreneurs whose projects ultimately succeed. The higher payment attracts more entrepreneurs and thereby increases the lender's pro…t. The higher payment also increases the welfare of all entrepreneurs, so Pareto gains arise.
A di¤erent conclusion can emerge when the productivity increase arises from a more basic training program that serves primarily to increase the probability that low quality projects succeed. This increased success probability renders entrepreneurs with low quality projects more anxious to have their projects funded. To deter excessive applications for funding, the lender may reduce the payment she promises to an entrepreneur whose project succeeds.
The reduced payment reduces the welfare of entrepreneurs. The increased proportion of entrepreneurs with low quality projects that apply for funding also reduces the lender's pro…t. Thus, productivity increases can produce Pareto losses.
Our …nding that productivity gains can generate systematic losses in the presence of asymmetric information is an illustration of the general theory of the second best (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956-7) . In this regard, our analysis is related to studies that show how an agent can enhance his well-being by reducing his capability. For example, Gelman and Salop (1983) demonstrate how a producer can pro…t by limiting its ability to expand output. 5 Gupta et al. (1994 5 Gupta et al. ( , 1995 explain how a supplier can bene…t from choosing ine¢ cient locations or transportation costs. Fletcher and Slutsky (2010) show how a political candidate can bene…t from a less favorable reputation.
In many of these studies, an agent bene…ts as his ability declines because his diminished capability induces a less aggressive response from a direct rival (e.g., a competing producer or an opposing political candidate). In our model, enhanced productivity can harm an entrepreneur because of the ensuing reaction of the supplier of a complementary input (the lender) rather than a rival. 6 Our analysis also di¤ers from its predecessors because we document Pareto losses from productivity gains whereas many other studies show that a productivity reduction can enable one party to gain at the expense of another. 5 Joskow and Kahn's (2002) observation that an electricity supplier can bene…t by withholding electricity from the market can be viewed as a variation on this theme. 6 Anant et al. (1995) show that a producer may gain by adopting an ine¢ cient production technology that induces the government to impose a less stringent ad valorem tax. 7 Bose et al. (2011) analyze a moral hazard setting in which a principal and agent can both gain as the agent's production costs increase.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the key elements of our model. Section 3 analyzes a benchmark setting in which all parties share the same information ex ante about the quality of each entrepreneur's project. Section 4 presents our main …ndings, emphasizing the conditions under which productivity increases generate systematic losses.
Section 5 provides concluding observations and discusses some extensions of the analysis.
The proofs of all formal conclusions are presented in the Appendix.
2 Elements of the Model.
We consider a setting where, as is common in practice, entrepreneurs have limited wealth and so rely on a lender (e.g., a venture capitalist) to …nance their projects. The lender in our model has imperfect information about the likely payo¤ from the project of any particular entrepreneur. The sole lender employs the available screening technology to determine whether to …nance the projects of entrepreneurs who apply for funding.
For simplicity, we assume that each entrepreneur has either a high quality project or a low quality project. A high quality project has a relatively high probability of success (p H 2 (0; 1)). A low quality project has a relatively low probability of success (p L 2 (0; p H )).
A project generates payo¤ V > 0 when it succeeds and 0 when it fails. Each project requires a …xed investment of I > 0. A high quality project generates positive net surplus, i.e., p H V > I. A low quality project generates negative net surplus, i.e., p L V < I.
Each risk neutral entrepreneur knows the quality of his project. The risk neutral lender does not share this knowledge. Initially, the lender knows only that the fraction H 2 (0; 1) of entrepreneurs have high quality projects and the complementary fraction L = 1 H have low quality projects. The lender eventually observes an informative signal (s 2 fp L ; p H g) about the quality (i.e., the success probability) of the project of each entrepreneur that applies for funding. The signal reveals the true project quality with probability q 2 (
and reports the incorrect project quality with probability 1 q. 8 q is su¢ ciently large that 8 q is assumed to exceed 1 2 to ensure the signal is truly informative about project quality, and not simply pure noise. q is assumed to be less than 1 to avoid unrealistic settings in which the lender can ascertain perfectly the quality of each lender's project. the lender optimally funds projects for which she observes the favorable signal and declines to fund projects for which she observes the unfavorable signal.
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Each entrepreneur experiences a transactions cost when applying for funding. This cost could re ‡ect the time required to develop a compelling project description and associated business plan, for example. Variation in total transactions costs among entrepreneurs is captured in standard Hotelling fashion. Entrepreneurs with low quality projects ("L entrepreneurs") and entrepreneurs with high quality projects ("H entrepreneurs") are both distributed uniformly on the line segment [0; 1]. The lender is located at 0. The total number of entrepreneurs is normalized to 1. An L entrepreneur located at point x incurs transactions cost t L x in applying for funding. The corresponding cost of the H entrepreneur is t H x. We will denote by x i 2 fx L ; x H g the location of the i 2 fL; Hg entrepreneur farthest from the lender that applies for funding.
Entrepreneurs decide whether to apply for funding after observing the share of the payo¤ from a successful project ( ) the lender o¤ers to approved entrepreneurs. An entrepreneur whose approved project fails receives a payo¤ of 0.
10 An entrepreneur will apply for funding if and only if his expected return from doing so exceeds his transactions costs. Thus, an L entrepreneur located at x will apply for funding if and only if
An H entrepreneur located at x will apply for funding if and only if p H V q t H x.
We assume that the unit transactions cost for H entrepreneurs (t H ) is not too much higher than the corresponding cost for L entrepreneurs (t L ) relative to the incremental surplus generated by a high quality project and the proportion of high quality projects in the population. This assumption avoids the uninteresting outcome in which the lender sets = 0 and thereby avoids funding any projects. Formally, Assumption 1 is assumed to hold 9 We abstract from any cost of producing this informative signal, and take the screening accuracy (q) to be exogenous. As explained in more detail in the concluding section, our primary …ndings persist in settings where q is endogenous and the lender must incur higher costs in order to discern project qualities with greater accuracy. 10 Among all feasible payment structures, this payment structure creates the strongest di¤erential incentive for H entrepreneurs to apply for funding. Consequently, this payment structure is optimal for the pro…t maximizing lender.
5 throughout the ensuing analysis:
The timing in the model is as follows. First, each entrepreneur privately learns the quality of his project. Second, the lender announces the sharing rate for approved projects. 12 Third, entrepreneurs decide whether to seek funding for their project from the lender. Fourth, the lender assesses the project quality of each entrepreneur that applies for funding. The lender funds the projects that produce a favorable signal and declines to fund projects that produce an unfavorable signal. 13 Finally, the outcome of each funded project is observed publicly.
When an entrepreneur's project succeeds, he receives V and the lender receives
The lender's (expected) pro…t in this setting when he sets sharing rate is:
The …rst term to the right of the equality in (2) re ‡ects the pro…t the lender anticipates from L entrepreneurs. This pro…t is the product of the number of L entrepreneurs that apply for funding ( L x L ), the probability that a low quality project is funded (1 q), and the di¤erence between the lender's expected payo¤ from a low quality project (p L V [1 ]) and the cost of …nancing the project (I). The last term in (2) re ‡ects the corresponding pro…t the lender anticipates from H entrepreneurs.
The ensuing analysis examines the e¤ects of productivity increases on the lender's pro…t and on the welfare of entrepreneurs. The welfare of L entrepreneurs, given sharing rate , is:
11 As demonstrated in the proof of Lemma 3, assumption 1 ensures that the lender's pro…t is strictly increasing in at = 0 for all q 2 ( 1 2 ; 1). 12 We assume that the lender can make a binding commitment to deliver the promised sharing rate. In doing so, we abstract from the possibility that the lender might try to expropriate entrepreneurs by reducing after they apply for funding. Reputation concerns can promote such commitment, for example. 13 Entrepreneurs whose request for funding is denied, like entrepreneurs who do not seek funding, earn 0 (in the wage sector of the economy, for example).
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The …rst term to the right of the equality in (3) is the product of the number of entrepreneurs
and an L entrepreneur's expected payo¤ from a funded project (p L V ). The second term to the right of the equality in (3) re ‡ects the aggregate transactions costs of L entrepreneurs that apply for funding.
The corresponding welfare of H entrepreneurs, given sharing rate , is:
We will consider two types of productivity increases: increases in the expected payo¤ of a project and reductions in the cost of project implementation. The expected payo¤ of a project increases when the payo¤ from success (V ) increases and/or the probability of success (p L or p H ) increases. The cost of project implementation declines when the …nancing cost (I) declines and/or transactions costs (t L or t H ) decline. As the analysis in Section 4 reveals, these di¤erent types of productivity increases can produce qualitatively di¤erent e¤ects.
3 Benchmark Setting with Symmetric Ex Ante Information.
Before analyzing the e¤ects of productivity increases in the setting described in Section 2, we brie ‡y consider these e¤ects in the following symmetric information setting. In this benchmark setting, each entrepreneur and the lender initially share the same imperfect knowledge of the quality of the entrepreneur's project. It is common knowledge that an entrepreneur has a high quality project with probability H and a low quality project with probability L . Each entrepreneur decides whether to apply for funding and pursue his project before learning the quality of his project. All parties also know that an informative signal about the quality of each entrepreneur's project will be produced if the entrepreneur applies for funding. A high quality project generates a favorable signal (and so is funded) with probability q 2 ( 1 2
; 1) and an unfavorable signal (and so is not funded) with probability 1 q. A low quality project generates a favorable signal (and so is funded) with probability 1 q and an unfavorable signal (and so is not funded) with probability q. For simplicity, each entrepreneur is assumed to face the same unit transactions cost in seeking funding, i.e.,
14 Lemma 1 explains how the various productivity increases under consideration a¤ect the pro…t maximizing sharing rate.
Lemma 1. The lender increases the sharing rate ( ) in the symmetric information setting as V , p L , p H , and/or H increase, and as I decreases.
The conclusions reported in Lemma 1 re ‡ect standard considerations. The expected net surplus from each entrepreneur's project increases as V , p L , p H , and/or H increase and as I decreases. Consequently, the lender increases the sharing rate in order to induce more entrepreneurs to apply for funding.
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The lender's optimal response to productivity increases in this setting produces Pareto gains, as Observation 1 reports.
Observation 1. The lender's expected pro…t and the entrepreneurs' expected welfare both increase in the symmetric information setting as: (i) V , p L , p H , and/or H increase; and
(ii) I and/or t decline.
The lender bene…ts from the increased potential pro…t generated by the various productivity increases considered in Observation 1. The entrepreneurs bene…t from the increased sharing rate and, when relevant, their reduced transactions costs or the increased expected payo¤ from their projects.
The conclusions reported in Observation 1 are not surprising. It is natural to expect productivity increases to generate gains that are shared by the participants in the entrepreneurial sector of an economy. What may be more surprising is that productivity gains can produce Pareto losses in arguably more realistic settings where entrepreneurs initially have private information about the quality of their projects.
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4 Main Findings.
We now return to the setting of primary interest in which each entrepreneur is privately informed about the quality of his project. We begin by identifying the locations of the L entrepreneur (x L ) and the H entrepreneur (x H ) farthest from the lender that apply for funding, given sharing rate .
Lemma 2 re ‡ects the obvious conclusion that more entrepreneurs will apply for funding as the expected payo¤ from their project (p i V ) increases, as the sharing rate ( ) increases, as the probability that their project will be funded increases, and as their transactions costs
Lemma 2 helps to characterize the equilibrium (pro…t maximizing) sharing rate ( ), the lender's equilibrium pro…t ( = ( )), the equilibrium welfare of L entrepreneurs (W L = W L ( )), the equilibrium welfare of H entrepreneurs (W H = W H ( )), and equilibrium total
. These measures are speci…ed in Lemmas 3 -5.
Lemma 3. The equilibrium sharing rate is:
Lemma 4. The lender's equilibrium pro…t is:
Lemma 5. The equilibrium welfare of L entrepreneurs, the equilibrium welfare of H entrepreneurs, and equilibrium total welfare are, respectively:
Now consider how the lender adjusts the equilibrium sharing rate in response to various productivity increases.
Lemma 6. The equilibrium sharing rate ( ) increases as: (i) V , p H , H , and/or t L increase; and (ii) I and/or t H decrease.
The conclusions in Lemma 6 re ‡ect the following …ve considerations. First, as V increases and/or I declines, each project generates more surplus. Consequently, the lender increases the sharing rate ( ) in order to induce more entrepreneurs to apply for funding. Second, as p H increases, a given increase in attracts more H entrepreneurs. 17 Therefore, the lender increases as p H increases to attract more high quality projects, which o¤er greater potential pro…t as p H increases.
Third, as the proportion of H entrepreneurs in the population ( H ) increases, a given increase in attracts a higher proportion of high quality projects. Consequently, the lender's pro…t increases more rapidly as increases, which leads the lender to set a higher sharing rate. Fourth, when L entrepreneurs incur higher transactions costs (i.e., as t L increases), they …nd it more burdensome to apply for funding. Consequently, the lender can increase to attract more high quality projects without fear of attracting too many low quality 17 Formally, from Lemma 2,
projects. Fifth, when H entrepreneurs incur smaller transactions costs (so t H declines), an increase in becomes more e¤ective at inducing them to apply for funding. Consequently, the lender increases to attract the pro…table high quality projects.
The impact of an increase in p L on the pro…t-maximizing sharing rate is less straightforward, as Lemma 7 suggests.
Lemma 7. As the success probability of a low quality project (p L ) increases, the equilibrium
An increase in p L has two countervailing e¤ects. First, it renders the decision of L entrepreneurs to seek funding more sensitive to the prevailing sharing rate, . 18 This e¤ect leads the lender to reduce in order to discourage L entrepreneurs from applying for funding.
Second, the lender incurs a smaller loss on each low quality project she …nances. This e¤ect leads the lender to increase (in order to attract more H entrepreneurs). The second e¤ect is of greater importance when p L is relatively large, and so the lender …nances relatively many low quality projects.
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The conclusions in Lemmas 6 -7 help to explain the e¤ects of productivity increases on equilibrium pro…t and welfare. Proposition 1 identi…es productivity increases that generate Pareto gains.
Proposition 1. The lender's pro…t ( ) and the welfare of both L and H entrepreneurs (W L and W H ) increase as: (i) V and/or p H increase; and (ii) I and/or t H decline.
The Pareto gains identi…ed in Proposition 1 re ‡ect the following four considerations.
First, an increase in V increases the lender's pro…t by increasing the expected payo¤ from each entrepreneur's project. The increased pro…t induces the lender to increase in order to 18 Formally, from Lemma 2,
19 Notice from Lemma 2 that
, which increases as p L increases.
attract more entrepreneurs, which increases their welfare. Second, a reduction in I increases the lender's expected pro…t by reducing her investment costs. In response to the increased pro…tability of each project, the lender increases in order to attract more entrepreneurs, which increases their welfare.
Third, as t H declines, a given increase in induces more H entrepreneurs to apply for funding. 20 Consequently, the lender increases in order to attract more high quality projects.
The lender's pro…t increases as she …nances a higher proportion of pro…table projects, and all entrepreneurs bene…t from the higher sharing rate. Fourth, an increase in p H increases the pro…t the lender secures from each high quality project she …nances. An increase in p H also increases the sensitivity of the decision of H entrepreneurs to apply for funding to the prevailing sharing rate. 21 Consequently, the lender increases in order to attract more H entrepreneurs, which increases the welfare of all entrepreneurs.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that several forms of productivity gains generate Pareto improvements. Proposition 2 considers the impact of one additional form of productivity gain -an increase in the proportion of high quality projects in the population ( H ). 22 The proposition refers to the following assumption. Assumption 2.
[ An increase in the proportion of high quality projects increases the lender's pro…t directly.
It also induces the lender to increase in order to attract more H entrepreneurs. The increase 20 Formally, from Lemma 2,
22 An increase in H might arise from a training program that transforms some low-skilled entrepreneurs into high-skilled entrepreneurs, for example.
12 in increases the welfare of H entrepreneurs. It can also increase the aggregate welfare of L entrepreneurs under many plausible settings, including those in which Assumption 2 holds.
Assumption 2 will be satis…ed, for example, when the transactions costs of L entrepreneurs are relatively small. 23 When t L is relatively small, the increase in the sharing rate induces many L entrepreneurs to apply for funding. This source of increased participation for L entrepreneurs can outweigh the reduced participation that arises from the decline in the proportion of L entrepreneurs in the population.
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The discussion to this point has focused on productivity increases that generate Pareto gains. In contrast, Proposition 3 identi…es a productivity increase that can generate Pareto losses. The proposition refers to the following assumption. This outcome is illustrated in Table 1 
14 transactions costs (so t L = t H = 4), high quality projects succeed with probability 0:6, and the screening accuracy is q = 0:55. In contrast, when p L is large, relatively many L entrepreneurs apply for and receive funding if the lender's screening accuracy (q) is su¢ ciently limited. In this case, an increase in p L reduces the loss the lender incurs on each low quality project she funds. Consequently, the lender becomes less intent on avoiding low quality projects, and so increases in order to attract more high quality projects. The increase in increases W L and W H . Therefore, 27 This is approximately the range of p L realizations in which the lender secures more pro…t by …nancing only projects that generate a positive signal than by …nancing the projects of all entrepreneurs that apply for funding. For expositional ease, the entries in all columns but the …rst in Table 1 represent 1,000 times the actual relevant value.
28 When p L is close to 0, the lender funds the projects of very few L entrepreneurs and so does not reduce much, if at all, as p L increases. Consequently, an increase in p L serves primarily to increase the welfare of L entrepreneurs as more of them apply for funding. Formally, as shown in equation (22) 
Pareto gains can arise as p L increases in this setting with asymmetric information, just as they arise in the benchmark symmetric information setting.
When the lender's ability to identify project quality (q) is su¢ ciently pronounced, the lender can simply decline to …nance what he considers to be low quality projects rather than discourage L entrepreneurs from applying for funding by reducing . Consequently, the lender does not reduce much, if at all, as p L increases when q is relatively large.
Therefore, L entrepreneurs bene…t from an increase in p L when the lender has su¢ cient ability to distinguish between low quality projects and high quality projects. As Corollary 1 indicates, this ability need not be particularly pronounced. Corollary 2 implies that L entrepreneurs can bene…t more from a training program (or technological change) that enhances the performance of H entrepreneurs than from a program that improves their own performance. This more pronounced gain for L entrepreneurs arises from the larger increase in the sharing rate generated by the increase in p H . Table   2 illustrates the magnitudes of the relevant e¤ects in the setting where V = 50; I = 20; H = L = 0:5; q = 0:65; and t H = t L = 2:5. Proposition 5 is an immediate corollary of Proposition 4. As long as the increase in p L is su¢ ciently pronounced relative to the increase in p H , the conclusions of Proposition 4 will prevail.
Also for simplicity, we have taken the lender's ability to discern project quality, q, to be exogenous. However, many of our key qualitative conclusions hold more generally, as Proposition 6 indicates. The proposition considers the setting with endogenous screening.
In this setting, C(q) is the lender's cost of implementing screening accuracy q. C( ) is an increasing, convex function of q that gives rise to a pro…t function for the lender that is strictly concave in q with an interior optimum (q 2 ( 1 2
; 1)). Proposition 6. The lender's pro…t ( ) and total welfare (W ) both decline as p L increases in the setting with endogenous screening when p L is su¢ ciently small.
Given our focus on changes in entrepreneurial productivity, we have not analyzed the effects of changes in other elements of the model. Before concluding, we mention a somewhat subtle e¤ect of a change in the lender's screening accuracy, which might be viewed as a component of the lender's productivity. Recall that an L entrepreneur is unable to secure funding for his project when the lender assesses the project's quality accurately. Consequently, one might suspect that the welfare of L entrepreneurs (W L ) will decline as the lender's screening accuracy (q) increases. However, this is not always the case. It can be shown that the lender increases the sharing rate ( ) as q increases. Furthermore, the increase in can be su¢ cient to generate an increase in W L , despite the reduced probability that the project of a given L entrepreneur is funded. 30 This conclusion reinforces the basic message that asymmetric information about likely entrepreneurial performance can introduce important subtleties into an assessment of the welfare implications of improved productivity in the entrepreneurial sector.
Additional extensions of our simple model merit further investigation. For instance, richer payo¤ structures, more general screening technologies, and expanded project variety might be considered. Risk averse entrepreneurs with varying personal …nancial resources, multiple lenders, correlation in project qualities, varying and nonlinear investment costs, and entrepreneurial moral hazard might also be analyzed. These extensions of our analysis may introduce additional conclusions of interest. However, the extensions seem unlikely to alter the observation that the impacts of productivity increases in the entrepreneurial sector can be subtle and varied.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
Much as in the analysis in the proof of Lemma 2 (below), it is readily veri…ed that the borrower that is indi¤erent between applying for funding and not applying is located at:
Using (10), the lender's (expected) pro…t when he sets sharing rate is:
Maximizing S ( ) with respect to provides:
. (12) The conclusions in the Lemma follow immediately from (12).
Proof of Observation 1.
Substituting (12) into (11) reveals that the lender's (maximum) pro…t in the symmetric information setting is:
The welfare of entrepreneurs in this setting is:
The equality in (14) follows from (10) and (12). From (13) and (14), welfare in the symmetric information setting is:
The conclusions in the Observation follow directly from (15).
Proof of Lemma 2.
An L entrepreneur's expected payo¤ from applying for funding is [1 q] p L V . The L entrepreneur located farthest from the lender that will apply for funding is the one for whom this expected payo¤ equals his transactions cost: 20
The analysis for the type H borrower is analogous, and so is omitted.
Proof of Lemma 3.
Substituting from Lemma 2 into (2) reveals that the lender's pro…t when he sets sharing rate is:
. (16) Di¤erentiating (16) provides:
It is readily veri…ed that ( ) is a strictly concave function of , that
< 0, and
> 0 when Assumption 1 holds. Therefore, (5) follows directly from (17).
Proof of Lemma 4.
From (5):
From (16):
From (18):
From (19) and (20):
Relations (5) and (21) imply that is as speci…ed in (6).
Proof of Lemma 5.
From (3) and Lemma 2:
Substituting from (5) into (22) provides (7). Relation (8) is derived in analogous fashion.
From (6), (7), and (8), equilibrium total welfare is:
Proof of Lemma 6.
It is apparent from (5) that increases as V increases and as I decreases. Furthermore:
Proof of Lemma 7.
From (23):
Proof of Proposition 1.
It is apparent from (6), (7), and (8) that
The inequality in (24) follows from Assumption 1. Then from (6):
The inequality in (25) holds because p
Also from (6):
From (7):
The inequality in (27) holds because 2 p
Also from (7):
The inequality in (28) holds because p H V I > 0 > p L V I. Proof of Proposition 2.
From (6):
The inequality in (29) holds because p
From (8):
The inequality in (30) holds because p H V I > 0 > p L V I and because z > 0.
Since
Proof of Proposition 3.
From (9):
. (33) From (33):
. Since p L V I < 0, it is apparent from (33) and (34) that:
Proof of Proposition 4.
where
and
Proof. Di¤erentiating (6) provides:
Proof. From (37):
Furthermore, from (37):
Proof. The proof follows immediately from (i) and (ii) since
Relation (39) reveals that dW H dp L < 0 if p L I 2V
(since z > 0). Relation (40) reveals that
Since z > 0, (41) implies that
. Also, (43) implies that
(vi). From (7):
where:
From (44) and (45) imply:
From (45): 
(48) implies:
Relations (46), (49), (50), and (51) imply that @W L @p L > 0 when q is su¢ ciently close to 1.
(i) -(vi) constitute the proof of all conclusions in the Proposition other than the conclusion about Pareto losses. The Pareto losses identi…ed in the Proposition are illustrated in Table 1 in the text. The data in Table 1 were derived using Mathematica.
Proof of Corollary 1.
From Assumption 1:
Therefore, h (p L ) > 0 from (51), and so 
Proof of Corollary 2.
The data in Table 2 provide a proof of the corollary.
Proof of Proposition 5.
As noted in the text, the proposition is an immediate corollary of Proposition 4 since the relevant increase in p L can be made arbitrarily large relative to the increase in p H .
Proof of Proposition 6.
From (6), the lender's pro…t in this setting when she implements screening accuracy q is:
Let q = arg max q (q; C). Also let = (q ; C). Then:
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The last equality in (54) re ‡ects the envelope theorem. Relations (52) and (54) imply that
From (9), total welfare in this setting when the lender implements screening accuracy q at cost C(q) is:
From (52), (53), and (55):
c W (q; C) = 3 2 (q) C (q) = 3 2 (q) 2 3 C (q) = 3 2 h (q) e C (q) i = 3 2 (q; e C); where e C (q) = 2 3 C (q) .
Relation (56) implies:
The second equality in (57) re ‡ects the envelope theorem. (57) implies that d c W (q;C) dp L s = @W @p L . Therefore, the conclusion in the proposition follows from Proposition 4.
